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Abstract—As the number of Internet users has grown, so have
the security threats that they face online. Security warnings are
one key strategy for trying to warn users about those threats; but
recently, it has been questioned whether they are effective. We
conducted a study in which 120 participants brought their own
laptops to a usability test of a new academic article summary tool.
They encountered a PDF download warning for one of the papers.
All participants noticed the warning, but 98 (81.7%) downloaded
the PDF file that triggered it. There was no significant difference
between responses to a brief generic warning, and a longer
specific one. The participants who heeded the warning were
overwhelmingly female, and either had previous experience with
viruses or lower levels of computing skills. Our analysis of
the reasons for ignoring warnings shows that participants have
become desensitised by frequent exposure and false alarms, and
think they can recognise security risks. At the same time, their
answers revealed some misunderstandings about security threats:
for instance, they rely on anti-virus software to protect them
from a wide range of threats, and do not believe that PDF files
can infect their machine with viruses. We conclude that security
warnings in their current forms are largely ineffective, and will
remain so, unless the number of false positives can be reduced.
I. INTRODUCTION
People who spend time online routinely encounter security
warnings. While trying to achieve their work or personal
goals, users are frequently disrupted by prompts, adverts, chat
windows, pop-ups and alerts – a negative user experience.
As the number of Internet users has grown, so has the
number of security threats and the sophistication of attacks
[15]. The protection against those comes in various guises,
but security warnings are a common way of alerting users to
threats, and preventing them from unsafe acts. Thus, security
warnings have become part of the large number of disruptive
alerts users encounter today – but do they pay attention to
them, and even if they do so – do they follow their advice?
We conducted a study to determine if users heed security
warnings – and if not, why not. Our participants were pre-
sented with PDF download warnings in a naturalistic context
– they were invited to bring their own laptops to a usability
test of a new academic article summary tool.
In the recent years, PDF (Portable Document Format) files
have become one of the most dangerous file types [9]. To warn
about this threat, browsers, notably Google Chrome, intro-
duced warning messages into download dialog boxes (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Google Chrome’s PDF download warning.
But Google Chrome users registered their frustration in
forums: “I am not going to ‘cope with the warning’. I am
switching back to FF [Firefox Mozilla]. Working in publish-
ing, I need to download many PDFs every day from trusted
sources. I can’t add extra steps without affecting profitability”
[12]. Subsequently, Google Chrome version 10 changed the
algorithm making a warning show only if there was an indica-
tion that this might be a drive-by download not initiated by the
user. Google Chrome’s policy of frequent warnings provided
inspiration for our research – the number of warnings has been
steadily increasing, and given that users dislike disruptions to
their activities, it is questionable whether this is effective.
We present the results of a laboratory experiment with
120 participants, who responded to a recruitment ad for
an evaluation of an academic article summary tool, named
‘Summarix’. Participants were asked to test the tool on their
own laptops. The actual purpose of the study was to see
participants’ reaction to a PDF download warning they en-
countered when downloading a paper in one of the two test
cases. We maximised ecological validity by making security
the secondary task as it is in users’ everyday interactions, and
by having them put their own laptops at risk.
Our results show that – whilst nearly all participants noticed
the download warning, the vast majority (81.7%) ignored its
advice. The level of detail provided in the warning did not
make a difference. Female participants were significantly more
cautious than male. The post-experiment interviews revealed
that our participants mainly ignored the warnings because
they have been desensitised by the high number of security
warnings, most of which turn out to be false positives.
The paper is organised as follows. First, we review pre-
vious studies on warnings. Second, we describe the design
of the experimental study, and the debriefing interviews that
followed. Third, we present and discuss the findings and
limitations of our study. In the final section, we make sugges-
tions on how to overcome desensitisation and make warnings
work. We suggest that algorithms triggering warnings need
to become more accurate, to reduce the number of warnings
users experience. Warnings also need to communicate the
threat and consequences more accurately, to correct current
misconceptions.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Dismissal due to False Positives
Previous research on security indicators and warnings shows
that users often ignore them and choose to rely on their
own assessment of online risks instead. Wu et al. [33] found
that participants disregarded toolbar warnings even when they
were explicitly asked to pay attention to them. Users distrust
a toolbar once they have experienced false positives, for
example, if the tool warns them against a Website they know
to be legitimate. Fogg [10] describes this as an earned lack of
credibility.
B. Phrasing of Warnings
When it comes to the text displayed in warnings, there
seems to be a trade-off between providing enough detail but
being brief in order not to discourage users from reading.
Zeltser [34] advises warning designers to include enough detail
to help users make an informed decision, but at the same
time, to be brief and avoid technical jargon. Egelman et al. [8]
showed that users are more likely to ignore security warnings
that use technical jargon that is hard to understand.
C. Immersion in the Primary Task
Sharek et al. [27] conducted research on whether users
can distinguish fake pop-up warnings from real ones. Many
participants reacted wrongly to the stimulus pop-up and 42%
later explained that they just wanted to “get rid of the message”
and complete their task. Similarly, in a study on phishing, 45%
of participants stated that they ignored security warnings as
they were absorbed by their task and “had to take some risks
to get the job done” [33]. Sasse et al. [24] point out that user
behaviour is driven by their primary goal. If the users perceive
likely losses due to security issues to be less than losses they
would incur by not having completed the task, they will ignore
security advice to complete their task.
In many laboratory studies of security tools, participants
knew that the experiment was observing their security-related
behaviour. For instance, Wu et al. [33] made their participants
focus their attention on completing a task, nevertheless, they
told them in the briefing that “the purpose of the study was to
test web browser security indicators that detect fake web pages
that look like pages from well-known legitimate websites”.
This seriously threatens the validity of the results [8]. A study
cannot be ecologically valid if participants do not behave as
they would in the real world [25].
D. Real Risk
Sharek et al. [27] acknowledged the limitation that in their
study the security of the laboratory computer was at stake and
not the participants’ own computers. Sheng et al. [28] mention
a similar limitation to their study on phishing. They state that
participants might have been more willing to take risk as they
might have felt immune to any adverse consequences of their
actions. This is a serious limitation since decisions participants
take in an experiment are only generalisable when they are led
to believe they are really at risk [8].
In their study on phishing, Schechter et al. [25] showed
that those participants who used their own credentials were far
more security-vigilant than those in a role-playing condition
who were given login details from the experimenters and
therefore experienced no direct personal threat from their
actions.
III. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
A. Specific vs. Generic Warning
In this study, we investigate to what extent users do pay
attention to warnings, and whether not paying attention is
due to warnings being too generic. Sunshine et al. [29] have
argued that current messages do not convey in sufficient detail
what can happen in a security risk, and how likely it is to
happen, and suggest that user behaviour can be improved
through warnings in which this information is given. We tested
this suggestion to see whether increasing the seriousness of
a warning by naming possible consequences and mentioning
the probability would influence the likelihood of a PDF being
downloaded. We hypothesise that participants will be largely
desensitised towards the generic warning because of every-day
exposure and will be more likely to ignore it (H I ).
B. Demographic Characteristics
We also wanted to monitor if different types of people
react differently to the warnings – based on their gender,
browser use, computer literacy and virus exposure. There
is a large body of research exploring risk appetite in men
and women (e.g., [3]), and results show that women are
more risk-averse than men. Thus, we hypothesise that female
participants in our experiment will be less likely to download
an article with a warning than males (H II ). We hypothesise
that existing users of Google Chrome will be more likely
to ignore the warning than users of Firefox Mozilla, due to
previous exposure (H III ). We also control for characteristics
relating to computer experience, looking at whether those with
varying computing skills and virus experience differ in their
reactions to a warning. We hypothesise that those with a high
level of computer expertise will be more likely to recognise
the warning as being a false positive, and download the article
(H IV ). We hypothesise that those who have had negative
experience with viruses, scams and fraud will be less likely to
download an article with a warning (H V ).
IV. STUDY DESCRIPTION
A. Participant Recruitment and Demographics
Participants were recruited through the UCL Psychology
Subject Pool. We advertised for participants in a usabil-
ity study focussing on an academic article summary tool.
There were four requirements for participation. (1) Participants
needed to be at least 18 years old. (2) They were required to
bring their own laptop to the study. (3) The laptop needed to
run Windows OS (since UNIX and Mac OS differ in security
and HCI). (4) Participants had to be fluent in English (they
must have lived in an English-speaking country for at least
a year). Requirement 2 was explained as being necessary be-
cause the study wanted to check tool display and performance
on different types of laptops. Requirement 4 had to do with
the assessment of the quality of the summary produced by
the tool. The test took place in a usability laboratory in the
UCL Department of Computer Science. Participants received
a fee of £14 for their participation in the study lasting for
about 50 minutes. 125 participants took part, 5 were later
excluded because of incomplete data. 53.3% (64) participants
were female and 46.6% (56) male. Age ranged from 19 to 52
years (M=25.7, SD=6.1, variance=37). As their main browser,
44 (36.7%) participants reported using Google Chrome, 40
(33.3%) Firefox Mozilla, 33 (27.5%) Internet Explorer and
three used other browsers. Participants’ length of computer use
ranged from 5 to 30 years (M=13.6, SD=4.6, variance=21.1).
B. Design
The experiment was a between-subjects design. The partic-
ipants were randomly assigned to two conditions, they were
either shown a generic or a specific warning (Fig. 2 and 3).
While the text of the generic warning was vague (directly taken
from the Google Chrome download dialog box), the specific
warning mentioned that some malicious elements had been
detected within the PDF, that it could cause massive damage
to the participant’s computer and assessed the probability of
it happening as high.
Fig. 2. Generic warning.
Fig. 3. Specific warning.
C. Materials and Apparatus
During the recruitment process, participants were required
to fill out an online form asking them for demographic details
(gender, age), their reading habits (to keep up the appearance
of a study on an academic article summary tool) and their
computing skills. Upon arrival, participants were given an
information sheet and an informed consent form.
In the semi-structured interview, participants were asked
three questions: (1) Whether they could identify which warn-
ing they saw from a set of four (two original warnings and
two similar distractors). (2) What they would have done if they
were confronted with any of the remaining three. (3) Whether
they have had any experience with scams, viruses or fraud.
An eye-tracker Tobii x50 was used to gather data on
participants’ eye movement during the computer-based task
and to produce a screenrecording which the experimenters
and the participant watched afterwards. The main aim of
having an eye-tracker was to establish how much attention
participants paid to the warning and whether they read it.
Tobii Studio 2.0.4 software was used for data analysis. The
laboratory computer ran Windows XP, the screen size was
22” with a resolution of 1920× 1080 pixels. The reading task
placed in a browser simulator was designed using the Python
programming language.
V. PROCEDURE
Upon arrival, the participant was asked to read through an
information sheet and sign a consent form. The experimental
set-up was explained to the participant and they handed over
their laptop to the first experimenter. The first experimenter
connected it to wireless Internet, established an UltraVNC con-
nection with the lab computer and placed the Summarix icon
on the participant’s desktop. It was not possible to conduct
the entire study directly on participants’ computers due to the
eye-tracker which was installed on the laboratory’s computer.
A briefing sheet was then given to the participant and they
read it. Finally, the task was explained to the participant using
a task list with bullet points.
For the task, the participant sat at the lab computer and
they could see the desktop of their laptop on the screen of
the lab computer. The experimenters pointed to the Summarix
icon placed there. Then, the eye-tracker was calibrated. Upon
starting of the eye-tracking, the task appeared in the browser
simulator. At this stage, the participant was reminded of the
time limit and the experimenters left the room.
Once the participant had finished, the experimenters re-
entered the room. Together with the participant, they watched
the screenrecording of the task. The experimenters asked
usability questions relating to Summarix, consistent with the
description of the study on a summary tool. When the warning
appeared, the second experimenter asked: “Oh, what was
that?” and looked at the participant waiting for their interpreta-
tion of what happened. Then the experimenter asked: “So what
did you do?” to elicit some more explanation. Afterwards, they
continued watching the screenrecording, and the experimenters
asked further questions relating to the tool.
After the screenrecording, a semi-structured debriefing in-
terview followed which was audio-recorded. Each participant
was asked the same questions; however, if they were willing
to share any other computer security-related experience, they
were welcome to do so. Once the interview was finished,
the participant was fully debriefed in line with UCL’s ethics
guidelines. The experimenters stressed that the participant’s
computer was not harmed in any way. The participant could
ask any questions. Finally, the participant received payment.
VI. RESULTS
A. H I: Reaction to Warnings
In both conditions, 98 (81.7%) participants downloaded
an article with a warning, and only 22 (18.3%) participants
refused to do so. For generic warning, 52 (86.7%) participants
decided to download the article and 8 (13.3%) refused to do
so. For specific warning, 46 (76.7%) participants download the
article and 14 (23.3%) refused to download it (Table I). Despite
fewer downloads for the specific warning, this difference is not
statistically significant (p=0.24).
Warning Refusal Download Total
Generic 8 52 60
Specific 14 46 60
Total 22 98 120
χ2 = 1.4, p = 0.24, df = 1
TABLE I
REACTIONS BY WARNING TYPE: DOWNLOAD VS. REFUSAL TO DOWNLOAD
B. H II: Gender
Regardless of warning type, of those who refused to down-
load an article with a warning, 16 were female and 6 were
male. This difference was found to be statistically significant
(p=0.048). When split by warning type, the difference was not
statistically significant – not surprising given the small counts.
C. H III: Browser Use
Among those 22 participants who did not download an
article with a warning, 8 used Google Chrome as their main
browser, 7 Mozilla Firefox and 7 Internet Explorer. These
numbers are proportional to the numbers of participants who
reported using the browsers and there is no statistically signifi-
cant relationship between browser use and reaction to warning.
D. H IV: Computing Skills
We explored whether participants with different levels of
computer literacy differed in their reaction to a warning.
A score for computing skills was computed based on five
questions. Two of them were direct: (i) “How many years have
you been using computers?” (ii) “How would you rate your
level of computing skills?” and three were proxy-questions:
(i) “Have you ever designed a Website?” (ii) “Have you ever
registered a domain name?” (iii) “Have you ever configured a
firewall?” For the length of computer use, the data was split
into quartiles based on the distribution. Four categories were
formed of those who have been using computers for (1) five to
ten years, (2) eleven to thirteen years, (3) fourteen to fifteen
years and (4) sixteen to thirty years. Corresponding to this,
participants were given scores from 1 to 4. The self-rating of
computing skills was on a five-point scale from ‘very low’
to ‘very high’. No participant stated that their skills were
‘very low’, thus, the levels ‘low’ and ‘average’ were grouped
together and ‘high’ and ‘very high’. A score of 0 was given
for the first and 1 for the second. In the three proxy-questions,
a score of 2 was given for each ‘yes’ and 0 for each ‘no’.
The scores for computer literacy ranged from 1 to 11. The
mean score for computing skills for those who downloaded an
article was 4.7 and for a person who refused to download it
3.2. This difference was found to be statistically significant in
a t-test (p=0.005). The higher the level of computer literacy,
the more likely were the participants to download an article
with a warning.
E. H V: Virus, Scam and Fraud Experience
Based on interview data, each participant received a score
between 0 and 3 for their virus, scam and fraud experience
(the higher the score, the more significant the experience).
The score was assigned by two researchers independently
and in the case of any discrepancies, a structured discussion
helped them to identify the appropriate score. To avoid bias,
the two researchers listened to interview recordings and did
their rating not knowing how any of the participants reacted to
the warnings. Participants who refused to download an article
with a warning had a higher mean value for virus, scam and
fraud experience (2.32) than those who downloaded the article
(1.78). This difference was found to be statistically significant
in a t-test (p=0.037).
F. Hypothetical vs. Actual Response
In the beginning of the interview, we asked participants to
identify the warning they saw in the study from a set of four.
After they had identified it, we asked them what they would
have done with the remaining three warnings. Based on their
answer, a comparison was made between participants’ actual
behaviour and what they claimed they would have done. In
the case of the generic warning, 19 (32%) of participants who
were not confronted with this type of warning in the task said
they would not have opened the file. However, out of those
who were confronted with that specific warning, only 8 (13%)
refused to download the file. The difference between self-
reported and observed behaviour was even more pronounced
for the specific warning, here 47 (77%) participants who did
not get this kind of warning in the experiment stated they
would not have downloaded the file. In the experiment, only
14 (23%) participants in the generic warning condition refused
to download the file.
Discrepancies between self-reported and observed be-
haviour have received considerable coverage in privacy re-
search [4], [14]. In our study, we attribute them to the social
desirability bias due the fact that in the interview participants
started to realise that the study was on security rather than
a summary tool. When asked directly how they would react
to a warning, the participant may be giving an answer they
believe is ‘correct’ and expected from them. Of course, there
are other factors that made participants say they are more
attentive to warnings than they actually are, one of them is
the fact that they were directly asked for what their reaction
would be by the experimenters. Nevertheless, it shows that
without the deception element in the study the results might
have been different.
G. Attention Paid to Warning
Eye-tracking data was analysed to establish the total time
of how long a participant focussed on the first warning. Two
t-tests were conducted to establish whether the differences
between warning and reaction types were significant. Regard-
less of whether the participant decided to open or discard the
chosen article, participants fixated their gaze for an average
of 6.13 seconds for generic warnings, and 6.33 for specific
warnings (p=0.9). When considering reaction type, participants
fixated their gaze on the warning (specific or generic) for an
average of 6.94 seconds if they ultimately refused to download
the article, and for 5.63 if they downloaded it (p=0.39).
The long fixation times which indicate that participants read
the text of the warning are supported by results from the
semi-structured interviews. Here, 107 participants correctly
identified the warning they had seen within the task, suggesting
that participants did pay attention to the warnings, regardless
of warning type and their subsequent reaction.
H. Reasons for Reaction
In the interviews, we asked participants why they down-
loaded the article despite a warning. The answers were tran-
scribed and analysed. For each participant, at least one reason
was identified through a thematic analysis [2], although in
many cases the participants mentioned more than one. They
were free to do so and all reasons were taken into account.
The following categories of rationale were identified:
1) Desensitisation: 55 of our 120 participants mentioned
desensitisation to warnings as a reason for disregarding them.
Participant 115, for instance, said: “I thought the warning was
just a routine thing”. 12 participants explicitly stated that they
realise that most warnings are just false positives: “I decided
to open it because the pop-up came for all of the articles. So
I thought it just must be a like a generic thing. Sometimes the
nature of the PDF itself will produce it even if there is nothing
wrong” (P005).
2) Dismissal of a Pop-up: 12 participants stressed that
they did not take the pop-up warning seriously because they
associate pop-ups with annoying adverts and updates: “I didn’t
think it was a serious problem, it was just like a pop-up,
something you get all the time” (P003).
3) Trusted Source: 29 participants mentioned that they
perceived the laboratory setting as a trusted environment. They
said that similarly, they would have trusted their friends or
lecturers that they are not letting them download anything that
is malicious. Participant 017 stressed: “It depends on what the
source was, if I was getting it from a dodgy Website, I probably
wouldn’t download it. But if something was sent to me by a
friend or a lecturer or I was downloading it from a library
catalogue, I would have opened it anyway”.
4) Focus on the Task: 20 participants said that being
focussed on their reading task made them want the warning
to disappear: “I just wanted to get to the task” (P021).
5) Trust towards Anti-virus: 18 participants mentioned feel-
ing protected by their anti-virus software: “I trusted that the
anti-virus on my computer would pick anything up” (P026).
6) Trust towards PDF: 15 participants said they trusted
PDF as secure file format and dismissed the warning: “I don’t
think PDF files can have this kind of harm in them” (P087).
Two reasons were mentioned for the trust – the omnipresence
of the files and their appealing aesthetics. Again participants
judged trustworthiness by cues that are salient in the real world
but not necessarily in the online world [16].
VII. DISCUSSION
81.7% of participants opened the file regardless of warning
type. From the observed behaviour and responses in the de-
briefing interviews, we can infer that the warning text does not
matter, because most of our participants had been conditioned
just to ‘swat away’ warnings. Additional reasons given for
ignoring the warnings were trust in the researchers who had
set up the experiment, reliance on anti-virus tools, and lack
of awareness of the risks associated with PDFs. We found
that those who did not download a PDF with a warning were
mostly women, participants with lower levels of computing
skills, and those who had experienced viruses, scams or fraud.
A. Problems Associated with Warnings
Pop-up warnings of the kind we used in our experiment
ignore basic principles of usability: as Cooper [5] would put
it, pop-up warnings in dialog boxes are impolite, disrupting
users’ primary task. It is basic HCI knowledge that warnings
should be reserved for genuine exceptions, and only ask users
to make decisions they are capable of making.
Current warnings are also hardly distinguishable from other
pop-up windows which users are conditioned to ‘swat away’
such as adverts and updates. Figure 4 shows a download
dialog box from Internet Explorer and Figure 5 shows Internet
Explorer suggesting the user disables some add-ons to speed
up the browsing. These pop-ups have different functions and
the urgency with which they need to be dealt with differs,
nevertheless, they have exactly the same design. They both
look very elegant, nevertheless, they might be quite confusing
to the user. As West [32] stresses, security messages should be
instantly distinguishable from other dialogs and this principle
is clearly violated here. Furthermore, both pop-ups appear at
the bottom of the screen and this is likely to cause confusion in
the beginning and increase user effort since the gaze does not
fall there [20]. Dhamija et al. [7] warn that indicators placed
outside of the user’s focus of attention are likely to be ignored.
Messages like “This type of file can harm your computer.
Are you sure you want to download?” shift the focus from the
software being unable to detect potential malicious elements to
putting pressure on the user. However, Google Chrome is not
alone here, the wording of the download warning in Opera is
problematic too, it states: “It is not known whether this type of
Fig. 4. Internet Explorer’s download dialog box.
Fig. 5. Internet Explorer suggesting disabling add-ons to speed up browsing.
file is safe. Are you sure you want to download it?” (Fig. 6).
By using the passive rather than the active voice (“it is not
known” vs. “we don’t know”), it takes away the focus from
the browser not being able to check the file for malicious
elements to the user who has to be sure about the download.
Fig. 6. Opera’s warning text in a download dialog box.
VIII. FOLK MODELS OF INTERNET SECURITY
In our experiment, we found that those with high level of
computer expertise were less likely to heed a warning. One
might think that they rejected the warning as they knew it was
a generic one. In the post-experiment interview however, the
participants revealed a number of misconceptions.
Based on Wash [30], we identified the following folk models
(inaccurate mental representations of the real world which may
lead to erroneous decision-making [6]) of Internet security in
our interview data.
A. The Anti-virus Will Save the Day
18 participants downloaded an article with a warning be-
cause they trusted their anti-virus to deal with any problems.
Participants did not realise that anti-virus software may not be
able to cope with all kinds of threats, such as zero-day attacks
and sophisticated malware (e.g., rootkit).
B. Viruses Have an Instant Effect
We also saw outdated knowledge regarding viruses, with
participants expecting an immediate and visible effect if their
computer contracted a virus: “I saved it and then nothing bad
happened. If it was really bad and I downloaded a virus to
my computer, I would have expected like the ‘blue screen of
death’ ”. In the past, some hackers left images or animations
on the victims’ computers in order to cause unrest. Today,
the longer a hacker can stay undetected with their malware or
spyware, the longer they can extract the victim’s resources.
C. Trust towards the Source
29 participants said they decided to download the article be-
cause they trusted the researchers not to make them download
malicious files. They mentioned that they would trust friends
and lecturers in a similar way. There are two kinds of problems
here. First, participants did not realise that even the people
they trust might not themselves be aware of the malicious
elements in their files. Second, they did not realise the risks
of impersonation: email accounts can be hacked, especially if
users have poor password practices and the industry has low
standards [1], [21]. Third, it is possible to create a plausible
email address and send out messages to people the targeted
user knows using information from social networking sites.
D. PDFs are Safe
15 participants expressed a great deal of trust towards PDF
files, particularly due to their omnipresence and professional
look – we found users are largely unaware of the risks
associated with this widely used filetype. The reason for this
might be that the mass use of PDFs as attack vectors is a fairly
recent phenomenon.
E. “Not Me, not this Time”
Seven participants stressed that they did not believe some-
thing bad would happen to them or this time. This is a psy-
chological mechanism already observed by West [32]. Users
don’t believe that they are a target, because they have nothing
valuable on their computer or only little money in their bank
account. This is an erroneous belief first identified by Weirich
and Sasse [31], our findings show that this misconception
of attacks being personally targeted persists. In the case of
an untargeted attack, criminals are not after some valuable
data but just after computing power, they want new machines
for their botnet to launch large scale attacks. In the case of
financial fraud, the attackers are usually not after big sums, but
want to steal a little from many people as small transactions
are less likely to draw attention [19].
IX. CONCLUSIONS
A. Why Do Users Ignore Warnings?
81.7% of participants in our study ignored warnings, and
most of those who did justified doing so with previous
experience of online security warnings being false alarms. In
this situation, users’ dismissal of a download warning is what
Herley [13] describes as rational rejection of security advice:
the effort of reading a warning and the cost associated with
not downloading a file are much greater than the perceived
likelihood of harm from a virus. Additionally, the probability
of an attack happening is relatively low. Schneier [26] ex-
plained how experience of false alarms desensitises defenders
and enables attacks; the way in which the vast majority of our
participants responded provides yet another example.
Those with higher level of computing skills ignore the
warnings more often than those who are not confident in their
computing skills – meaning users with more experience of
current security warnings pay less attention to them. This is
hardly a ringing endorsement for the effectiveness of current
warnings. But our interviews show that the confidence of
experienced users is not matched by knowledge.
As the results of our experiment indicate, participants rely
on their own judgment, rather than a security warning. This
aligns with previous results which showed that participants
judged the legitimacy of a Website by how it ‘looked and
felt’ [11], [33] and interpreted signs as trust signals that are
not valid in the online environment [16], [23] rather than used
other more salient cues (e.g., URL).
B. How to Make Warnings Work?
As the responsibility for ignoring warnings was identified on
both sides, the users’ and the industry’s, attempts to overcome
desensitisation and protect users from malicious PDF files
need to be made in two directions.
C. Restore Trust in Warnings
Users need to be re-sensitised. As long as there is a high
number of false positives, users will not heed warnings. For
that reason, it is necessary to significantly limit the appearance
of warnings. To achieve this, browsers should give up on the
idea of warning about possible harm to the user’s computer
each time they want to download a file. Sophisticated and
intelligent algorithms need to be developed to diminish the
number of false positives. This might be time and resource-
consuming, and needing frequent updates; nevertheless, it
might turn to the browser’s advantage over competitors.
The Venn diagram in Figure 7 shows when warnings should
be used. At any other time they are redundant.
Case 1. Genuine concern of significant danger, with certainty
of maliciousness. Here the warning is redundant as the action
must simply be blocked without warning to protect the user.
Case 2. No certainty of maliciousness, and no genuine
concern of significant danger. Here the warning is redundant
and if shown is simply an expression that “We have no real
clue, but we will interrupt your work flow anyway”.
Case 3. The intersection. Here is the only situation whereby
a warning can be justified. The case where genuine danger has
been detected within, but there is still a chance that the file
in question is not malicious. Rather than simply block, there
must be an option to still download it.
Fig. 7. A Venn diagram illustrating when users should receive a warning
message.
Only displaying warnings when the intersection is true
would cut down the number of warnings faced and would in
turn make them less likely to be swatted away and instead read
and contemplated. Assuming we could get to this point, where
the sophistication of detection improves enough to support
such genuine warnings, the question remains as to what the
user should do next and whether they at this point have enough
information to make the correct decision. If we consider the
fact that even the most experienced and diligent users are
still fallible and that for every thousand correct decision it
only takes one wrong one to ruin all the good work, we must
conclude that the user is still ill-equipped to deal with these
decisions with consistent correctness.
We conclude that in general, the user should not be the one
left responsible. In a corporate situation security specialists
could instead be in charge of making these decisions, the
company’s security being their primary task, whereas other
users in the company are instead fixated on their goals.
Elsewhere ISPs must do more to take the burden away from
the user. What is of utmost importance is getting as far away
from the current warning culture as possible. The number of
false positives means no added security, and hands a perfect
platform to attackers. Users will either ignore warnings as they
do not trust them or if able to they will disable the warning
systems completely.
D. Provide Education and Training
The poor state of participants’ knowledge on online security
is worrying. Education is urgently needed; first, the users need
to be made aware of the fact that PDF files can carry malicious
elements and second, that they can lose a lot if they behave
carelessly online. However, the place for education should not
be in the dialog box when the users are in the middle of their
critical activities, but elsewhere. Several participants stressed
that they would welcome some guidance or even training
from the ISPs or the state. As shown in studies on phishing,
education can have a significant impact on the participants
being able to recognise a fake Website from a real one [17],
[18], [28]. However, while for phishing users can perform
some checks themselves (looking at the URL, SSL etc.), it
is hard for them to do the same for PDF files. Therefore,
research is needed into what kind of security checks can be
performed and which ones would be the least time-consuming
and disruptive ones for the users.
E. Limitations
There are a number of limitations to our study that need to
be acknowledged. First, most participants were students and
rarely older than 35. For that reason, the findings might not be
generalisable to different age groups in the wider population.
Second, there was a problem of the participants trusting their
computer would not be harmed in an experiment carried out at
a university. Third, the experiment focussed only on one single
reaction of a participant which might not be representative of
their general behaviour.
X. FUTURE WORK
The limitations of our study open space for future work.
Future research should aim to study users’ reactions to browser
warnings in a more comprehensive way, considering security
and privacy threats alike. Unobtrusive, privacy-aware monitor-
ing of participants’ computers could record their behaviours
towards warnings over a longer period of time. This measure
would ensure the reactions are elicited in a natural setting,
in different contexts, and record reactions to a much wider
variety of warnings and alerts. As a cost-efficient alternative,
crowd-sourcing could be used as a testbed [22]. Field exper-
iments have the additional benefit of age and occupational
variety, which could influence how people react to warnings.
Parallel studies could be conducted in different environments
or contexts, to see whether the reactions would be different
than they were in a university setting.
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